We examine the use of credit default swaps (CDS) in the U.S. mutual fund industry. We find that among the largest 100 corporate bond funds the use of CDS has increased from 20% in 2004 to 60% in 2008. Among CDS users, the average size of CDS positions (measured by their notional values) has increased from 2% to almost 14% of a fund's net asset value. Some funds exceed this level by a wide margin. CDS are predominantly used to increase a fund's exposure to credit risks rather than to hedge credit risk. Consistent with fund tournaments, underperforming funds use multi-name CDS to increase their credit risk exposures. Finally, funds that use CDS underperform funds that do not use CDS. Part of this underperformance is caused by poor market timing.
Introduction
The market for credit default swaps (CDS), the major credit derivative to date, has grown tremendously until 2007, surpassing the sizes of the U.S. stock market, the mortgage market, and the U.S. treasury market together.
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Major end-users of CDS are banks, hedge funds and insurance companies, which use CDS to insure their fixed-income portfolios, provide credit protection to others, or to benefit from perceived market mispricings. Over the past few years, the use of CDS has caused significant losses at a number of banks, and even led to the collapse of the largest insurance company in the U.S.: AIG. Little is known, however, about the use of CDS by mutual funds. In fact, many investors may be unaware that the bond funds they are holding trade in CDS, exposing them to significant risks. For example, on Feb. 13, 2009, a class action suit was filed alleging that OppenheimerFunds, Inc. misled investors about the derivatives and leverage exposures of the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund, which has lost 74% of its net asset value in 2008, partially due to its exposure to credit default swaps.
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The objective of this paper is to document the use of CDS in the mutual fund industry, so as to understand to what extent, why and how mutual funds are using these derivatives. In particular, our data allow us to differentiate between four CDS strategies: long versus short CDS, and single-name versus multi-name CDS. on average funds use single-name CDS to increase their credit exposures rather than to hedge credit risk. With respect to multi-name CDS, funds switch between being net sellers and net buyers. While buying credit protection can reduce a fund's overall credit risk exposure, the volatility in the multi-name CDS positions suggests that funds may be using CDS to actively take positions rather than to passively hedge credit risk. 5 The notional values of the CDS positions exceeded 50% of a fund's NAV for six funds in our sample: Intermediate Funds that use CDS are more likely to belong to a larger fund family and exhibit higher asset turnovers. The first result is consistent with the fact that trading in the CDS market requires additional costly infrastructure, which only larger fund families, due to economies of scale, are willing to invest in. A higher asset turnover identifies more actively managed funds. Thus, the second result is consistent with the hypothesis that actively managed funds use CDS for trading purposes. The higher liquidity in the CDS market compared to the corporate bond market would make CDS the preferred instrument for trading purposes.
Funds that use CDS perform worse on average than funds that do not use CDS. CDS users have lower absolute and relative fund returns than CDS non-users. For example, the relative return differential between CDS users and CDS non-users is about 72 basis points p.a. between 2004 and 2008 . CDS users have slightly higher return volatilities than CDS non-users, but the economic and statistical significance is weak.
We find that underperforming funds tend to increase their short (multi-name) CDS positions during the second half of a calendar year. These results are consistent with the tournament hypothesis by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) . According to this hypothesis funds that underperform increase risk in order to improve their relative performance rankings. Since CDS tend to be more liquid than many corporate bonds, shorting CDS would be the most costeffective way to increase risk for corporate bond funds.
The increase in short multi-name CDS is also negatively correlated with credit spreads, i.e., when credit spreads increase funds' short multi-name CDS positions decline. This negative correlation would be consistent with a belief in mean-reversion in credit spreads, i.e., managers reduce their short CDS positions when they expect credit spreads to increase. However, we further find a negative correlation between changes in short multi-name CDS positions and future credit spread changes. Funds increase their short CDS positions before credit risk premia fall, and decrease their short CDS positions before credit risk premia rise. This effect is present over the entire sample period 2004 -2008 . This implies that changes in funds' CDS positions has been unprofitable on average, and thus must have contributed to the poorer performance of CDS users.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the data and the data sources. Section 4 contains our econometric analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
Literature
Our results contribute to several strands of the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that examines the use of CDS by mutual funds. Several papers examine the use of CDS by banks. Mahieu and Xu (2007) , and Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009) Verschoor and Zwinkels (2010) analyze the relation between credit derivatives and the probability of default of the 20 largest European financial institutions. They find that the use of credit derivatives increase default risk.
Several studies have examined the use of derivatives by mutual funds, but none has focused on credit default swaps in particular or specific derivatives strategies as we do. Koski and Pontiff (1999) survey equity mutual funds and find that the use of derivatives is positively correlated with asset turnover and membership in a fund family. These results are consistent with our findings with respect to the use of CDS. Our results, however, are in contrast to Johnson and Yu (2004) , who find that the use of derivatives is negatively correlated with fund age, and positively correlated with fund size. Marin and Rangel (2006) also find that derivatives usage is positively correlated with fund size. In addition, funds that are part of a fund family, no load funds, and funds with higher management fees are ceteris paribus more likely to use derivatives. Deli and Varma (2002) and Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) investigate mutual funds' investment constraints. Deli and Varma (2002) find that funds with the highest transaction cost benefits are more likely to permit investments in derivatives. Furthermore, Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) show that constraints on derivatives are more common if boards contain a higher proportion of inside directors, if the portfolio manager is more experienced, if the fund is managed by a team rather than an individual, and if the fund does not belong to a large organizational complex. One advantage of focusing on the use of CDS is that the available data allows us to examine to purpose of derivatives strategies, i.e., we can distinguish between strategies that increase or decrease total fund risk. The prior literature has only examined the use and the extent of derivatives usage.
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Another related literature focuses on the strategies fund managers use to alter the performance and risk characteristics of their funds. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) interpret the mutual fund industry as a tournament. The winners of this tournament, i.e., the best performing funds, receive the highest inflows of new money (see Sirri and Tufano, 1998) . This benefits fund managers because some of their compensation is linked to the size of the fund and hence new fund inflows. Therefore, managers of underperforming funds have an incentive to increase their funds' risk levels in order to close the return gap with competitor funds. Consistent with this prediction, the authors find that growth-oriented U.S. mutual funds, which underperformed during the first half of a fiscal year, increase fund volatility in the second half of the fiscal year to a greater extent than overperforming funds. showing that underperforming corporate bond funds increase fund risk by increasing the size of their short multi-name CDS positions.
The above papers also examine how derivatives usage is associated with mutual fund performance. For example, Koski and Pontiff (1999) find that 21% of equity funds use derivatives, but there are no statistical differences in the risk and return characteristics between funds that use derivatives and those that do not. However, the impact of past performance on fund risk is significantly less for funds that use derivatives than for funds that do not. Almazan, 7 Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that net fund flows are more sensitive to performance differences of high return funds than of low return funds. Thus, fund managers of top performing funds benefit more from rank improvements than managers of poorly performing funds. 8 Chavalier and Ellision (1997) find similar results. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) find evidence that U.S. equity mutual funds adjust the risk they take depending on the relative position within their fund family. In contrast, Chen and Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) also find no evidence that the permission to use derivatives correlates with equity fund returns. Johnson and Yu (2004) find that among Canadian domestic equity funds derivatives users have lower returns and higher risk than non-users. Among fixedincome funds, however, derivatives users have higher risk and higher return levels than nonusers. Johnson and Yu do not explain why they observe these differences, however. Marin and Rangel (2006) provide a more negative picture for Spanish mutual funds. In their sample, 44% of fixed-income funds use derivatives. Funds that use derivatives slightly outperform non-users. In addition, these authors find evidence suggesting derivatives are used for speculation. All of these studies base their conclusions on univariate comparisons. Hence, they leave the question unanswered, whether derivatives usage impacts fund performance. In contrast, we examine whether fund managers appropriately adjust their CDS positions before credit risk premia change.
We find that fund managers incorrectly anticipate future changes in credit spreads on average.
Thus, their use of CDS must have negatively affected fund performance.
Data
Since 2004, U.S. mutual funds are required to disclose their derivatives holdings semi-annually on Form N-Q. We focus our analysis on the largest 100 U.S. corporate bond funds by net asset value that are included in the CRSP survivorship-free mutual fund data base as of the end of the We manually cross-check our search algorithm by randomly selecting 30 N-Q forms without any of the above key word hits. In none of these cases do we find CDS holdings. For funds with CDS holdings we manually collect for each CDS position the notional value, the reference asset, the expiration date of the swap, the counterparty, whether the swap was bought or sold, the swap premium, and the unrealized gain or loss of the swap position.
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This step generated information on 14,906 CDS positions.
Results
In this section we examine how widespread the use of CDS is among the top U.S. corporate bond funds, why some funds use CDS while others do not, what CDS strategies mutual funds use, and also determine the impact of CDS usage on fund performance.
The Use of CDS by U.S. Corporate Bond Funds
In this section we describe the top 100 U.S. corporate bonds funds in terms of fund size and other fund characteristics. We also describe the size, type and direction of the CDS positions used by these funds, and how CDS strategies evolved over time. One objective is to determine whether fund managers use CDS to increase their fund's exposure to credit risk or to hedge credit risk of the existing bond positions. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the top 100 bond funds. Not surprisingly, bond funds are large. The mean and median NAVs are $5 billion and $2 billion respectively. The dispersion in fund sizes is large and highly skewed. NAVs range from 264 million to over 130 billion. The reason why there appear to be a number of smaller funds under the top 100 is that 10 To ease the extraction process from the raw txt and html files, we download the N-Q forms again from EdgarOnline, a subscription-based website, which already transforms the fund holdings into standard rft and pdf formats. We find 289 different N-Q forms that include at least one of these key words. However, in many cases, the CIK number refers to a family of funds rather than to one specific top-100 fund. We thus search for the top-100 fund names and exclude those N-Q forms that do not cover our top-100 funds. Additionally, we analyze right-censoring in the CDS holding history because this occurrence might be due to i) a change in the fund name; ii) a close of the respective fund; iii) a merger with another fund. In the last two cases the fund history ends while in the first case we employ the fund history. Since some fund families, in particular large ones such as Fidelity with 12 funds, contribute more than one fund, we are left with 379 N-Q form-fund observations from 65 top-100 funds with CDS data. The average fund age (since inception) among the top 100 bond funds is 20 years, ranging from as little as four years to 73 years. About 75% of the top 100 funds belong to a larger fund family, i.e., a fund family that has at least two funds among the top 100 corporate bond funds in its portfolio. The total expense ratios of the top 100 funds range from 0.13% to 1.75%.
12
There are nine index funds in our sample, which feature average total expense ratios of less than 0.25%. The total expense ratios of investment grade funds average about 0.61%, while the total expense ratios of high yield funds are almost double and average at 1.06%. The asset turnovers also appear to differ significantly between investment grade and high yield funds. The turnover ratio of investment grade funds is with 1.79 more than twice the turnover ratio of high yield funds.
Finally and somewhat surprisingly, we find that 50% of investment grade funds use CDS, while only 27% of high yield funds use CDS. Judging from the reported book values of outstanding CDS positions (see Table 2 Next, we analyze the types and direction of CDS positions taken by the top 100 bond funds. We distinguish between four general strategies. Funds can buy or sell CDS, and these CDS can be written on a single reference asset such as a corporate bond (single-name), or on a portfolio of bonds, or a CDS index (multi-name).
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When funds buy CDS they buy credit protection, and thus reduce their credit exposure if the reference asset is part of the fund's holdings. When they sell CDS they sell credit protection, and thus increase their credit exposure.
For example, single-name CDS can be used to create synthetic corporate bonds, which may provide better returns than actual bond investments due to the higher liquidity in the CDS market.
To create a synthetic corporate bond a fund would sell a single-name CDS and invest the notional value in a risk-free security. Another CDS strategy is known as a negative basis trade. In this case a fund would purchase a corporate bond and purchase a CDS on the same bond. Such trade would yield positive cash flows if the spread of the bond is higher than the spread of the CDS (negative basis). Of course, a negative basis trade is subject to counterparty and liquidity risk, which may partially explain the lower CDS spread. This example shows how using CDS can expose mutual fund investors to new, possibly unexpected risks.
Multi-name strategies can be used to increase (decrease) a fund's credit risk exposure by selling (buying) CDS on a reference asset, which corresponds to the fund's general asset holdings. If the reference asset does not correspond to the fund's other assets, then selling CDS could help diversify the fund. The high liquidity of multi-name CDS also makes them preferred speculative instruments to take a view on the future development of credit spreads. Thus, if a fund manager wishes to time the market we would expect him to do so using multi-name rather than single-name CDS. The higher volatility of multi-name strategies also becomes apparent if long und short CDS positions are netted at the fund level. The average multi-name net position switches back and forth between being net long and net short, while the average single-name net position is almost always net short. This volatility suggests that multi-name CDS may be used for position taking rather than hedging considerations, and thus dependent on the manager's view about the future development of the overall credit risk premium. Interestingly, the CDS users among the top 100 funds were net short in both multi-and single-name CDS during the financial crisis, which started in the second half of 2007. This was the wrong period to be net short in credit markets, and has resulted in serious losses at some funds. We will examine the impact of CDS in more detail in Section 4.3. Do fund managers consider the four CDS strategies separately, or are long and short CDS positions interrelated? For example, do mutual funds managers employ strategies in which they take a view on credit spread differences? To answer this question we graph the notional value of CDS positions against the net notional value in Figure 3 . If funds speculated on credit spread differences we would expect large notional values while the net notional values should be close to zero. The scatter plots in Figure 3 show that this is rarely the case. When the net notional values are zero, the notional amounts tend to be small as well.
To summarize, by 2008, the top 100 U.S. corporate bond funds were as likely to hold CDS positions as hedge funds were to hold derivatives. Bond funds use CDS predominantly to increase a fund's exposure to credit risk rather than to hedge credit risk. While some single-name short CDS positions can be rationalized by synthetic bond investments, the volatility in multiname CDS positions suggests managers may be timing credit markets.
The Determinants of CDS Strategies
In the next step we examine which funds / fund managers are more likely to use CDS, and the motives behind the four CDS strategies. As the prior literature on mutual funds has shown, some fund managers may have incentives to improve fund performance by increasing fund risk, while others have incentives to reduce (hedge) risk. In particular, a fund's past performance has been associated with the willingness of a manager to take on additional risk.
We first estimate logit models based on all 100 funds in our sample to determine the determinants of CDS usage. The prior literature has shown that the use of derivatives by mutual funds is related to fund size, asset turnover, membership in a fund family, fund age, and fund expenses. We follow this literature and use all of these variables as regressors. We also control our regressions for the fraction of a fund's NAV held by retail investors because institutional investors may influence a fund manager regarding CDS usage, while it is unlikely that such pressure would come from retail investors. In addition, we distinguish between investment grade and high yield funds, and include dummy variables for each time period to control for common time effects. Table 4 reports the marginal effects from pooled logit models (Columns I and II), and marginal effects from fund level random effects logit models (Columns III and IV). In Columns V and VI we report standard coefficients from conditional fund-fixed-effects logit models. Due to the inclusion of fund-fixed-effects only funds that began or stopped using CDS during our sample period remain in the sample. Consistent with Koski and Pontiff (1999) , we find that the use of CDS is positively correlated with membership in a larger fund family and asset turnover. If a fund belongs to a large fund family it is about 30% more likely to use CDS than funds that do not belong to a large fund family. This is understandable as trading in CDS requires additional infrastructure and thus causes additional costs. If these costs can be shared across several funds, the cost per fund decreases, so that the investment in the CDS infrastructure is more economical.
An increase in the asset turnover ratio by one standard deviation increases the likelihood to use CDS by 9-14%. Furthermore, the results in Columns V and VI show that asset turnover ratios increased on average following the adoption of CDS strategies. Asset turnovers can proxy for how actively a fund is managed. The positive correlation between asset turnover and CDS usage suggests that CDS are useful tools for active fund managers, which would be consistent with our earlier findings that CDS are used to take risks rather than to passively hedge risks.
These results are robust even after excluding the second half of 2008, which was characterized by unprecedented market dislocations.
We also find that older funds are significantly more likely to use CDS than younger funds.
When restricting the sample to funds that started or stopped using CDS fund age is, not surprisingly, no longer significant. Finally, institutional investors may have some impact on a fund's likelihood to use CDS, but the coefficients are statistically significant in only two out of our six specifications.
Next, we examine whether some of the CDS strategies are motivated by a desire to increase total fund risk following poor past performance. As discussed in Section 2, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) argue that managers of underperforming funds have incentives to increase risk in order to improve their relative performance ranking. In fact, the class action suit mentioned previously alleges that the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund "altered its investment style and began to significantly increase its risk in the hopes of seeking higher returns, including by dramatically increasing its use of derivative instruments." Applying this idea to the use of credit default swaps, we expect that funds with below average performance subsequently increase their CDS short positions and decrease their CDS long positions. In addition to just increasing risk, fund managers could also take directional positions and time credit markets, e.g., buy credit protection when they expect credit spreads to increase and sell credit protection when they expect credit spreads to decrease. Unfortunately, the expectations of individual managers are unobservable. We use current credit spread changes as a proxy for the market's expectation about future credit spreads based on the assumption that credit spreads are mean reverting.
14 Since we observe more volatility in multi-name CDS positions, we expect that multi-name CDS respond more to credit spread changes than single-name CDS.
In order to test these hypotheses we estimate the following fixed-effects model for each of the four CDS strategies.
We use two variables to measures the past performance of a fund. The first measure is defined as the difference between a fund's total return and the return of our fund-based benchmark. The second measure is defined as the difference between a fund's total return and the return of the passive benchmark. Since short CDS positions are negative we expect a positive coefficient on past performance (β 1 > 0). The credit spread is measured by the difference between the average yield on Baa-rated corporate debt and 10-year U.S. Treasury securities. If managers believe in mean-reversion then we would expect a negative coefficient (β 2 < 0). We control for crosssectional variation in fund characteristics by including fund-fixed-effects. Table 5 reports the estimation results of equation (1) using a Heckman selection model. In the first stage we model the decision to use CDS as in Table 4 . The main selection variables are the big fund family dummy, fund age, and the turnover ratio. Since the first stage results are similar to the results reported in Table 4 , we omit them in Table 5 Given that short, multi-name positions average at about 4% of NAV, this is an economically large increase. Thus, fund managers appear to use multi-name CDS to increase fund risk following poor performance.
In addition we find that changes in the short, multi-name CDS positions are negatively correlated with contemporaneous changes in credit spreads. If the credit spread increases by 50 bp, then the short position increases by around 2% of NAV. If the effect is causal, then such strategy would be sensible if fund managers believed in mean-reversion, and use the increased spread as an opportunity to speculate on falling spreads in the future.
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Interestingly, we find evidence of risk-increasing strategies and directional views only among short, multi-name CDS positions, but not among any of the other three CDS strategies.
This suggests that the determinants of these strategies follow different rationales. For example, it could be that single-name CDS strategies are mostly motivated by the creation of synthetic bond positions or negative basis trades. In this case it would not be surprising that single-name positions do to correlate with fund performance. Rather they should correlate with particular market conditions. Similarly, long multi-name CDS may be motivated purely by hedging considerations. It will be part of our future research to examine these possibilities in more detail.
To summarize, we find that funds that underperform subsequently increase their short multi-name CDS positions, which should tend to increase total fund risk. Furthermore, we find evidence of market timing only among short multi-name CDS strategies. These findings are consistent with the fund tournament hypothesis by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) , and to our knowledge the first time that evidence for fund tournaments among corporate bond funds has been found.
The Impact of CDS Usage on Fund Performance
In this last section we examine the impact of CDS usage on a fund's performance and risk characteristics. Depending on whether CDS are used for position-taking (speculating) or hedging objectives on average, total fund risk could either increase or decrease. If managers have no private information with respect to a firm's credit risk or overall credit risk premia, expected fund 15 Results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to account for the performance should not be affected. If managers have market timing ability with respect to credit risk, however, then we would expect higher returns for funds that use CDS for position-taking.
For example, Kosowksi, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) provide evidence that a sizable minority of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover the additional costs of stock-picking. In addition, the authors find that these managers persistently outperform their peers.
In a first step, we characterize the top 100 bond funds in terms of their average returns and standard deviation of returns. We consider both absolute and relative returns, as well as fund alphas. We estimate constant and time-varying alphas. Time-varying alphas are estimated by a smoothed Kalman filter using a bond market, a high yield and a mortgage securities factor following Huij and Derwall (2008) .
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Panel A of Table 6 shows descriptive statistics. Between 2004 and 2008 the top 100 bond funds yielded semi-annual return of 1% on average, ranging from -24% to + 8%. On average, the top 100 bond funds underperformed other corporate bond funds by 0.24% p.a., and underperformed comparable corporate bonds by 0.48% p.a. The variability in the relative performance is high, which ranges from -30% to +16% p.a.
Panel B of Since the univariate analysis in Table 6 does not control for other factors that may also affect performance, we perform a multivariate analysis of funds' absolute and relative returns in Table 7 . Here we regress fund returns and alphas on the CDS user dummy variable and fund characteristics, such as fund size, asset turnover, fund age, association with a larger fund family, the fraction of the fund held by retail investors, and whether a fund is an investment grade or high yield fund. We control for common time effects by including semi-annual time dummies.
The multivariate analysis confirms that CDS users have significantly lower returns than CDS non-users. The absolute return difference is 72 bp p.a. The relative return differences are 40-54 bp p.a.
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CDS users also appear to have lower alphas than non-users. In addition, we find that larger funds and investment grade funds have higher absolute and relative returns as well as higher alphas.
Next, we examine the standard deviations of returns of CDS users and non-users. The univariate analysis in Table 6 , Panel B shows that CDS users have higher standard deviations of both absolute and relative returns than CDS users. These differences seem to be driven by those funds that were net short in CDS, while the funds that were net long display return volatilities that were similar to the return volatilities of CDS non-users. This finding is consistent with the view that short CDS positions are used to increase a fund's total risk exposure.
In Table 8 we check whether these results hold up in a multivariate analysis. We regress the standard deviation of both absolute and relative returns on the CDS user dummy variable and several control variables that may be correlated with fund risk. In all regressions we find that CDS users display higher standard deviations of returns than CDS non-users. However, the coefficient is statistically significant in the last regression only. Older funds and investment grade funds have lower volatilities than younger and high yield funds. Surprisingly, funds with higher asset turnovers have lower return volatilities than funds with lower asset turnovers, but the economic magnitude of the coefficient is small.
Overall, we find that CDS users have significantly lower returns than non-users on average, while having the same or even higher standard deviations of returns than CDS nonusers. These differences persist even after controlling for time effects. The underperformance is somewhat less severe if fund alphas are considered.
The underperformance of CDS users can have several explanations. Funds that underperform may be more likely to use CDS hoping to improve performance. Alternatively funds' CDS strategies may generate losses that negatively impact performance. In order to judge whether the use of CDS has been beneficial to fund investors, we now focus on the second possibility. A challenge is the relatively short sample period (due to data availability), and the possibility that the poor performance of short CDS positions during the financial crisis is due to bad luck. We therefore focus on a partial aspect of the impact of CDS strategies on fund performance.
In Table 3 we observed that the average net multi-name CDS position fluctuated significantly between net short and net long over time. In Table 5 we report that short multi-name CDS positions are correlated with contemporaneous credit spread changes, which suggests that some fund managers are timing the credit market using multi-name CDS. We therefore aim at evaluating the success of market timing by examining how CDS positions changed before credit risk premia changed. For example, if funds increased their short positions before credit risk premia rose, then this would undoubtedly reduce fund performance.
To examine this possibility we follow the approach by Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2006) and regress changes in the sizes of each of the four CDS strategies on future credit spread changes.
We measure the credit spread by the yield difference between Baa-rated corporate bonds and 10-year U.S. Treasury securities.
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We estimate a fixed-effects model to control for unobservable fund fixed effects. The results show that on average funds decrease their short multi-name CDS positions before the credit spread rises. Such strategy clearly yields losses, and at least partially explains why CDS users generally underperform non-users. The effect prevails even if we exclude the second half of 2008. This result is consistent with Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2009) , who find that funds that increase risk perform worse than funds that keep stable risk levels over time. 18 We have also used the Aaa spread instead, without any material changes in the results. The Baa and Aaa spreads are highly correlated (ρ=0.97) Interestingly, we find no significant correlations between the other three CDS strategies and future credit spread changes. This is consistent with our earlier conclusion that these strategies follow other determinants, and firms primarily use short multi-name CDS to time credit markets. Unfortunately, they are not successful at this on average.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the use of credit default swaps by the top 100 U.S. Funds are generally net sellers of single-name CDS, which shows that managers use CDS to take risk rather than to hedge risk. They switch between being net sellers and net buyers of multi-name CDS. This volatility suggests that some fund managers use multi-name CDS to time credit markets rather than to hedge credit risk. Consistent with this possibility, we find that funds increase their short (multi-name) CDS positions when credit risk premia rise. Such strategy may stem from a belief in mean-reversion of credit spreads.
In fact, it is the underperforming funds that tend to increase fund risk by increasing their short, multi-name CDS positions. This result is consistent with the tournament hypothesis advanced by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) , which states that underperforming funds increase fund risk to try to improve their relative performance. CDS would be the instrument of choice due to the higher liquidity in CDS markets relative to corporate bond markets. To our funds has been established. Figure 1 for further descriptions of the sample). The upper figure refers to only multiname CDS positions, while the lower figure refers to only single-name CDS positions. The straight lines denote points for which the notional amounts equal the net notional amounts, i.e., funds hold either long or short CDS positions, but not both. All interior points refer to cases in which funds held both long and short CDS positions. A small number of outliers is omitted from these graphs to facilitate a meaningful comparison. Axes refer to $ millions. This table shows Otherwise, we refer to funds as investment grade funds. Asset turnover ratio is defined as annual asset sales / NAV. Fund age measures the number of years since a fund's inception. Big fund family is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the associated fund family consists of more than one fund in our sample and 0 otherwise. Total expense ratio is the sum of the fund's operating expenses which include 12b-1 fees over a fund's total NAV. It may include waivers and reimbursements. Fraction of retail investors is the proportion of a fund's total NAV held by retail investors (net asset value of retail investor fund classes / total NAV). CDS usage is a dummy variable if a fund uses CDS and zero otherwise. All data are taken from the CRPS survivorship free mutual fund data base. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the sum of CDS notional amounts for four separate CDS strategies. We distinguish between CDS written on a single asset (single-name) and a portfolio of assets or an index (multi-name), and whether a position is short (protection sold) and long (protection bought). Panel B shows the notional amounts of CDS positions relative to a fund's NAV for each of the four primary CDS strategies separately (CDS users only). Columns 5 and 6 also report the net notional amounts over NAV. The netting is done per fund-period and separately for multi-and single-name CDS positions. The last column reports the net notional amounts over NAV for multi-and single-name CDS lumped together. Table 3 . The second stage models the use of one of the four principal CDS strategies, measured by the notional principal over a fund's NAV. We regress changes in the use of each strategy on lagged fund returns (Return over fund-based benchmark t-1 and Return over passive benchmark t-1 ). The lagged fund returns are from the first half of a calendar year, while the CDS strategy variable is from the second half of the calendar year. See Appendix B for a description of the two benchmarks used. Δ Credit spread t is the second independent variable. It is the change of the credit spread of the average yield on Baarated corporate debt over 10-year U.S. Treasury securities (as in Figure 3 ) between the first and the second half of the calendar year. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Huij and Derwall (2008) . We provide constant alphas and time-varying alphas. The latter are estimated by a smoothed Kalman filter. Panel B shows return differences between funds that use CDS and funds that do not and between funds that were net short in CDS and funds that were net long. We consider funds' raw returns, as well as fund returns relative to two benchmarks. See Appendix B for details. We use univariate OLS regressions in Panels I and II with standard errors that are clustered at the fund level to test whether the differences are significant. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. This table shows fixed effect panel regression results of the four principal CDS strategies: multi-name (short) multiname (long), single-name (short), and single-name (long). In Panel A we consider multi-name CDS positions, while in Panel B we consider single-name CDS positions. In order to test whether fund managers correctly adjust their CDS positions in relation to future credit spread changes, we regress changes in the use of each strategy, measured by the notional principal over a fund's NAV, on future credit spread changes. The credit spread is measured by the Baa-rated bond yield over 10-year Treasury yields (as in Figure 3 ). We include fund fixed effects in all regressions.
Multi-name CDS positions
In robustness checks we exclude the second half of 2008, which was characterized by highly unusual market conditions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the fund level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
